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MUNICIPAL COURT PRACTICE
HARRY

W.

FOGLE

While our highest tribunals sit in vigilant watchfulness to safeguard those protections and rights granted to persons accused of
crime the insidious cancer of municipal court practice and procedure
threatens the foundations of our constitutional health.,
When my partner and I first undertook the practice of law more
than five years ago he, as Mr. Tutt, said: "Our duty as sworn officers
of the judicial branch of the Government renders it incumbent upon
us to perform whatever services our clients' exigencies demand." I,
Tutt, said, "Never turn down a case." 2 This creed, inspired by a
desire to obtain three square meals a day and to try the criminal
practice, has resulted in numerous appearances in municipal courts,
in close contact with police officers, and in realizations sufficient to
dismay anyone who holds dear the ideals of "presumption of innocence," "beyond a reasonable doubt," and many other fundamental
rights. This article attempts to point up some practical aspects of
the practice that may be of some interest, and that perhaps will prove
helpful, to the lawyer appearing in municipal court in defense of
clients.

PREVALENT POLICE AND MUNICIPAL COURT PRACTICES

The first portion of this article is not presented with the viewpoint
of amassing legal authority to prove some practices and procedures
of any particular municipal court wrong but rather to call attention
to certain prevalent methods of operation that should cause particular concern to lawyers appearing in city courts and general concern to all lawyers dedicated to legal theory and principle. The following questions, and the comments thereon, are prompted by actual
observation and information gleaned from police court reporters,
police officers, and prisoners.
'FLA. CONSr. Art. V, §34, authorizes the Legislature to "establish in incorporated
towns and cities, courts for the punishment of offenses against municipal ordinances."
2TRAIN, MR. Turr's CASE BooK 3 (1945).

[3991
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Why are city police officers permitted by some municipal
judges and city attorneys to "book" a citizen under a
"charge" of "investigation" and hold him incommunicado?
A personal check of the St. Petersburg blotter reveals that this practice has been indulged in on 1273 occasions in the first half of 1953. 3
On innumerable occasions I have heard a police officer inform a
friend or relative that he or she could not talk with the prisoner held
under this so-called charge. On five occasions I have had to call the
attention of police officers forcefully to our statutory provision4 in
order to gain access to clients so held.
There is no such crime as "investigation" known to the law, as
Judge Willard, of the Dade County Criminal Court of Record, scathingly and correctly pointed out in a recent proceeding.5 There is
no excuse for this disreputable custom. Its illegality is well known
to police officers, to city attorneys, and to municipal judges,G yet they
allow the practice to continue - although all of these officials are
sworn to uphold the law.
Of course habeas corpus is available and will lie. But the time,
expense, and effort consumed in obtaining service of the writ and a
ruling thereon are a tremendous burden to impose upon a person
imprisoned illegally in a manner known by the imprisoner to be
unlawful.7 Quite typically the lawyer is notified; visits his client in
jail; prepares the petition for a writ, and the writ; pays for filing and
service of the petition; and must prepare in a few short hours an
argument to repudiate the "case" of the arresting officers. By this
time the police have much vital information about the accused and
about the offense he is alleged to have committed. In any event,
St. Petersburg is a representative city, with a population above 100,000.
Figures elsewhere are comparable, e.g., Miami, 2145; Jacksonville, 1751; Tampa,
1447; and Orlando, 936.
4FLA. STAT. §901.24 (1951): "Any attorney at law entitled to practice in the
courts of this state shall, at the request of the person arrested or of some one
acting in his behalf, be permitted, forthwith upon his request, to visit the person
arrested and to interview him privately."
5In this case Judge Willard questioned a police officer as to the nature of the
charge for which the defendant was arrested. When the officer answered, "Investigation," the judge made the observation that such a crime was nonexistent.
GThey will admit their knowledge of the illegality of this procedure, if
questioned.
7
One Miami attorney may have the answer. He keeps on hand mimeographed petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as mimeographed writs.
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the accused in held under the charge of "Investigation" for only
48 hours; thereafter the charge becomes: "Investigation for [a specific
felony]."
An important procedural point to note in this connection is that
the circuit court has "final appellate jurisdiction... of judgments or
sentences of any Mayor's Court .. . ."s The writ of habeas corpus,
guaranteed by our State Constitution," initiates the proceeding in
the issuing court;10 and appeal, with a record, lies to the Supreme
Court."'
Why is so much weight given to the testimony of a police
officer in some municipal courts?
Granted, a police officer is entitled to have his testimony believed
but so is a reputable citizen entitled to credence. The author specifically recalls five cases in which the defendant was charged with
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants in
which the testimony of police officers was accepted in spite of exculpatory testimony from three unbiased and disinterested citizens
of unimpeachable integrity. Anyone attending regular sessions of
a large city's police court will, within two weeks' time, be capable of
foretelling almost verbatim the testimony of a police officer who has
arrested an allegedly "influenced" driver or one charged with any
of the more serious violations of ordinances.
The evil result of the foregoing is to shift not only the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the defendant's shoulders but
also to reverse the burden of proof and place it upon the accused in
violation of every basic precept of Anglo-American legal theory of
12
criminal prosecution.
-

SFBA. CONST. Art. V, §11. The mayor's court and the municipal court are,
of course, the same.
OFL.A. CONSr. Decl. of Rights §7.
loAlmost always the circuit court, FLA. CONST. Art. V, §11, although the Court
of Record for Escambia County may also issue this writ, id. Art. V, §39, as may
the Supreme Court or any justice thereof, id. Art. V, §5. For a summary of habeas
corpus in Florida see Adams and Miller, Origins and Current Florida Status of
the Extraordinary Writs, 4 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 421, 449, 455 (1951).
1FLA. CoNsr. Art. V, §5- unless, of course, the Supreme Court, after it or a
justice issues the writ, hears the return itself.
12Furthermore, FLA. CONST. Deci. of Rights §3, prescribes: "The right of trial
by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever." Yet, by the simple
expedient of calling municipal infractions "offenses" rather than "crimes," even
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Why are police officers in some cities encouraged to get a
conviction?
From hearsay sources, and directly from police officers "dressed
down" by superiors, comes the knowledge that a policeman signing an
affidavit against a citizen later found not guilty is reprimanded. If
the officer does this again within a relatively short period of time
the reprimand is increasingly stem. The inevitable result is to prompt
the arresting officer to testify so as to insure conviction.
In one large Florida city practically every police officer carries
with him a record of persons he has personally arrested, with the
outcome of the trial carefully noted therein. One ailing police officer
told me, "It's no wonder I'm sick, what with having duty all night
and then spending the morning prosecuting the guys I arrested."
Hundreds of times outside the courtroom I have heard an officer say,
"I won it," in answer to the question, "How did you do in court?"
Inestimable times I have heard policemen boast, "I sure beat attorney
Doe in court yesterday" - actually considering themselves in the
position of serving not only as witness but also as prosecutor.
The St. Petersburg police blotter shows that for the first half of
1953, in cases involving traffic violations alone, only 237 cases, or
roughly ten percent, resulted in dismissal. Of those dismissed, however, 161 involved a defendant charged with failing to have a state
driver's license in his possession, and the charge was dismissed upon
his appearing in court with the license. Disregarding these cases, we
find that this city obtained convictions in 97.5 percent of the
cases. It is fantastic to believe that the police could be right, beyond
a reasonable doubt, over 97 percent of the time; and it is impossible to
believe this when one realizes that in all probability the police officers
were not eye-witnesses in 99 percent of the accident cases.
Why do some municipal judges admit improper and incompetent evidence when the defendant is not represented
by counsel?
I have heard "guilty" intoned over hundreds of defendants against
whom was adduced only the testimony of the police officer who inthough both are identical in that they are punishable breaches of governmentally
imposed rules of conduct, the hapless accused in a municipal court is convicted
summarily by one lower court judge, sitting alone.
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vestigated the automobile accident and handed out a citation for a
traffic violation. The driver of the other car did not appear; and
the police officer, who usually had not arrived until five or ten minutes
after the accident, was permitted to testify as to speed, conditions,
direction of travel, and what the absent driver had said concerning
the collision. I have even seen a few convictions when neither the
arresting officer nor the other driver appeared in court; the officer
merely wrote a note to the court explaining the accident -and this
was accepted as sufficient evidence.
Perhaps one day some practitioner will have the pleasure of hearing a municipal judge or city attorney protect an accused by rebuffing
a policeman attempting to inject hearsay testimony. Until such day,
however, defense counsel must be on the alert, because the police
habit of so testifying crops up repeatedly even when the defendant
is represented by counsel.
Why do municipal judges and police chiefs fail to issue
strict orders to prevent violation of established rights?
Any police officer, as an individual, will tell you that he always
lets a defendant use the telephone and never uses force to obtain a
statement or physical evidence. Nevertheless, I have heard repeated
and profane denials of use of the telephone to arrested persons. I
have seen two Negroes and one white man slapped off a chair for
refusing to blow up a drunkometer balloon.
I have seen bond posted by friends of persons in jail, charged with
"driving while under the influence," and have then heard the desk
sergeant say, "Come back in four hours. We can't release him until
then." Desk officers in a great many cities have definite instructions
not to release a person charged with "driving while under the influence" until a certain period of time has elapsed.
Why do some city police departmentsrefuse to allow private
interviews between attorney and client?
The experienced attorney will of course demand that he be
allowed to consult his client in privacy, but on numerous occasions
I have had to insist upon that right, even though insistence should
be unnecessary. 13 Younger lawyers often allow themselves to be
13See

note 4 supra.
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bluffed out of privacy with their client by a jailor who will allow no
more than conversation through the cell door, or by a desk sergeant
who claims that the person is being interviewed by detectives. Of
course, counsel has a right to be present at any such interview, as
well as the right to privacy with his client.
The uninitiated may insist: "These things don't happen in my
town." Possibly not -but an exchange of notes and views with attorneys, reporters, and police officers throughout the state convinces
me that these practices are prevalent.
SUGGESTIONS FOR DEFENSE

The biggest difficulty confronting the defense attorney is often
of his own making, namely, the psychological barrier raised by the
approach of arguing what is commonly regarded as a very minor case
and receiving very little compensation for his labors. As a result
his legal research in most cases is not too comprehensive. Nevertheless the young lawyer just starting the practice can earn his grits
readily if he will devote to municipal court practice those hours of
spare time available to most neophytes in applied jurisprudence.
The most important single factor to keep in mind, as pointed out
above, is that the arresting officer is not testifying as a disinterested
and impartial witness but, rather, he is exerting his efforts toward
beating the lawyer. For all practical purposes the burden of proving
your client innocent is placed upon you by the court's attitude
toward the testimony of police officers. Some good may be done by
cross-examination of the policeman; but do not neglect to call
witnesses for your client, even if only character witnesses. The best
attitude is to treat your municipal court case as though you were
defending a man against a first degree murder charge.
Alleged violations of certain types of ordinances most frequently
require the lawyer's services; accordingly we shall consider these individually.
Driving While under the Influence of Intoxicants
The heaviest of fines and jail sentences, in municipal courts, are
meted out for violation of this ordinance. 14 In addition there is the
l4The common penalty is a $100 fine, 30 days in jail, or both. In case of an
accident the fine is increased and a jail sentence imposed.
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added mandatory, grave state penalty of loss of driver's license upon
conviction.- Although it is common to refer to the aforesaid penalty
as loss of license "for one year," such analysis is incorrect. One year
is the minimum, not the standard, period that must elapse before the
Department of Public Safety can grant a new license after revoking
one. 16 The drastic nature of the penalty, of course, induces higher
fees and a correspondingly greater amount of effort in securing acquittal. If the city ordinance punishing "drunken driving" is the
same as the state statute 7 the practitioner should be on the alert for
the following elements. ,
1. Driving. The offense requires driving, not just sitting at the
wheel of a stationary vehicle or riding as a passenger.' 8
2. Affidavit. The affidavit must charge the accused with driving
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants "to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired."" Ordinances in many
cities do not include those italicized words. 20 Furthermore, counsel
need not calmly accept a catch-all unconstitutional ordinance that
states, in effect: "Everything that is a misdemeanor by virtue of a
21
state statute is an offense under this ordinance."
3. Statements of the Accused and Results of Physical Tests. It is
a well-settled rule of criminal law that statements of an accused and
results of physical tests are not admissible in evidence until the
corpus delicti, or gravamen of the offense, has been established by
independent evidence."2 It is conceded that these are high-sounding
15F1LA. STAT. §322.26 (1951); §322.25 defines "conviction" as being in either a
state or municipal court.
16F.A. STAT. §822.28 (1951).
17FLA. STAT.

§317.20 (1951).

18The statute, ibid., states disjunctively that it is unlawful "to drive or be in
actual physical control of any vehicle within this state" while under the influence.
Seemingly something other than driving may constitute the offense under the
latter prohibition.
"I1bid. Unless the italicized words are included the charge imposes a
greater burden upon the defendant than the statute directs.
20They were finally added to the St. Petersburg ordinance after Victor 0.
Wehle, Circ. J., "suggested," without ruling, that the change be made. A conviction in Tampa Municipal Court was reversed by Harry Sandier, Circ. J., on
this point.
"'Kreulhaus v. Birmingham, 164 Ala. 623, 51 So. 297 (1909).
"E.g., Adams v. State, 153 Fla. 68, 13 So.2d 610 (1943).
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terms to toss around a city courtroom, but they are proper terms and
are rightfully used in defense. Police officers commonly begin by
testifying as to what the accused did and said immediately after the
arrest, but they should not be permitted to do so until every element
of the offense has been established prima facie.
4. Drunkometer. If your city uses this device familiarize yourself thoroughly with its operation. The basic chemicals used are sulphuric acid and potassium permanganate. The machine must be
thoroughly cleaned with distilled water, not ordinary water, before
each operation thereof. Any impurities present will result in a higher
reading. 23 The proper solution contains sulphuric acid of a strength
of 52 percent and potassium permanganate of a strength of five percent. The latter chemical will deteriorate, especially in sunlight, and
must not be kept on hand for more than thirty days. A weakened
24
solution results in a higher reading.
No Florida Supreme Court ruling on the admissibility of drunkometer results has been found, but there are at least two divergent
Florida circuit court rulings. 2 5 Probably others exist.
Again, even if the police officer can testify that a subject tests
two tenths of one percent on the drunkometer, the officer may well
2not be a qualified expert to testify as to the significance of the reading.
Customarily any reading in excess of 0.15 percent denotes prohibited
intoxicant influence, although it is well known that the effect of
alcohol on sense acuity varies among individuals and even as to the
same individual under differing conditions. Indeed, reports of any
blood tests or urinalyses introduced require expert testimony to
27
interpret the results.
23A recent test made on a subject by St. Petersburg police resulted in a reading
of over .50. Officers immediately rushed the man to the hospital in the belief
that he was dead, because no person is supposed to be able to live with that
concentration of alcohol in his veins. A later check, however, revealed that the
stopper in the sulphuric acid bottle was made of cork rather than glass and that
the resulting impurities caused the high reading.
-This information was obtained from B. J. Northrup, City of St. Petersburg Chemist since 1925 and Bacteriologist for the Pinellas County Health Department.
256th Cir. - admissible; 12th Cir. - inadmissible.

2sWehle, Circ. J., recently ruled that a police officer who had interpreted the
drunkometer reading was not an expert qualified to pass on the matter.
27Lopez v. State, 154 Tex. Cr. 227, 225 S.W.2d 852 (1949); see Note, Admissibility

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 6
MUNICIPAL COURT PRACTICE
Reckless Driving
Reckless driving, that is, driving "any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property," 28 as defined in
the state statute, is another very serious offense, especially in view
of the pyramiding penalties. 29 In Florida municipalities the practice
of charging a person with reckless driving whenever the authorities
doubt that they can obtain a conviction of drunken driving is prevalent. Usually the accused has had the customary "couple of beers."
Here too counsel should insist that the corpus delicti be established
before statements of the accused are introduced. Driving after having
imbibed "a couple" is certainly no offense; and the city must establish
prima facie that the accused was driving in a reckless manner or with
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.
Disorderly Conduct
Disorderly conduct is the police "catch-all," the offense seized
upon when the officer cannot decide what charge to place against the
party arrested. 0 The first move of defense counsel should be to seek
32
a bill of particulars. 3' He has a qualified but strong right to one;
and, although a request for it annoys the city, this motion serves the
proper, useful, and necessary purpose of informing the attorney and
his client of the exact nature of the offense allegedly committed.
This suggestion is not meant as a means to delay trial or to harass
the prosecution needlessly, but if it does appear that this "blanket
charge" has been placed for the sole purpose of holding the accused on
"skimpy" grounds the city attorney and police have no reason to complain when forced to be definite.
of Evidence Obtained by Scientific Devices and Analyses, 5 U. OF FLA. L. Rav. 5
(1952).
28FLA. STAT. §317.21 (1951).
29Ibid. For first conviction, not over 90 days' imprisonment or fine of from
$25 to $500 or both; for second, up to 6 months or $50 to $1,000 or both. On
third conviction within 12 months or forfeiture of bail not vacated, revocation of
operator's license is mandatory, id. §322.26.
30FL.
STAT. §856.02 (1951) sets out the state offense and lists "idle and dis-

orderly persons" as vagrants; §856.03 sets the maximum penalty at $250 or 6
months' imprisonment.
31
1n county and higher courts FLA. C.L.R. 13(e) has substituted a motion for
more definite statement, but reform in municipal procedure still lags.
32FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §11.
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ProceduralHurdles
There are hundreds of municipal ordinances. To suggest defenses
to all is obviously not feasible. The foregoing offenses were discussed
primarily because of the relative severity of punishment and the frequency with which they are charged.
The rules of evidence and of criminal procedure, and the precepts
of criminal law, are not outlawed in municipal court; it just appears,
at times, as though they are.
Appeal. The chief reason for apparently "making a mountain
out of a molehill" and countering with the strongest possible defense
is the difficulty of appeal. Review of a municipal court judgment
must be taken on the "record" - such as it is - and lies to the circuit
33
court as of right, in term time or vacation, for "speedy disposition."
The simple notice of appeal, which can be stated in one sentence,
must be filed with the municipal court clerk, or with the municipal
judge if there is no clerk, within thirty days of rendition of judgment;
this notice must either include or be accompanied by assignments of
error in brief form. Upon such filing the circuit court acquires
jurisdiction of the cause. Bills of exception and formal authentication
have been abolished. The circuit court is directed to examine the
record and to reverse, affirm, or correct the judgment, including a
lowering of the sentence.
The primary problem is the record itself. If the proceedings have
been "stenographically or otherwise reported, the court reporter, or
other person reporting the same with the consent or approval of the
court . . ." must file his transcribed notes with the municipal court
clerk or judge within fifteen days of the filing of notice of appeal.34
Normally, however, unless counsel requests a stenographic transcript
none is taken. In such event the municipal judge, who has full power
to correct the record even after filing, can preserve untranscribed
proceedings in pais by recital in his judgment, by separate order, or
by certification. Alternatively defense counsel and the city attorney
can stipulate. The circuit court also is empowered to make the

SSFg.A. STAT. §932.52 (1951), in its 17 subsections, sets forth the appellate
process here summarized.
3

4FLA. STAT.

§932.52 (7).
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record speak the truth, though he is seldom called upon to do so.
The net result is, as a rule, a record that is inadequate and at times
even misleading.
The municipal judge also has cogent powers as to the bond, which
must be double the fine and costs and, in an instance of prison
sentence, enough to cover costs taxed on appeal plus from $10 to $200. 35
This sole method of review seems harsh and unfair, especially as
regards such serious sentences as are meted out for "driving while
under the influence." By contrast the appellant from a conviction by
a justice of the peace has the right to a trial de novo, 30 in which a
proper record is made. Under our present municipal procedure the
best that defense counsel can do is to arrange in advance for a court
reporter to be present - and in every important case he should do
so even though he expects to win at the trial level. The mere fact
that an accurate record is being transcribed has a salutary effect on
the conduct of the proceedings. Cost of attendance of a court reporter
will be in the neighborhood of $10; the cost of transcription of the
record will, of course, vary with the length of the testimony. There
seems to be no valid reason why counsel cannot, if necessary, bring
his own stenographer.
If the Department of Public Safety37 suspends, revokes, or cancels
a license the operator aggrieved can apply to the Parole Commission
for revocation or modification of the ruling. 38 In practice any reinstatement requires at least two months. Alternatively, provided
revocation is not mandatory,3 ' the operator can appeal to a court
of record in the county of his residence. 40 Independent findings and
judgment are required.
Whether a municipal court can revoke a license is highly questionable. An appeal is now pending from a municipal court sentence, as
opposed to findings, in a drunken driving case in which the sentence
includes license revocation. State ex rel. Sellers v. Parker41 was de-

3rFiL.

STAT. §932.52(16).

The bond when filed with the circuit court clerk

operates as a supersedeas.
36F.A. STAT. §§932.53-932.56
(1951), implementing
37FLA. STAT. §322.01 (11)
38FLA. STAT.

FLA. CONS?. Art. V, §22.

(1951).

§322.31 (1951).

3SMandatory instances are listed id. §322.26.
4oFLA. STAr. §322.31 (1951).
4187 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924).
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cided long before enactment of the 1939 statute requiring revocation
42
in certain instances.
Jury Trial. The right to the use of the highway could not be
taken away without a trial by jury prior to the adoption of our State
Constitution; and it guarantees this right specifically.43 Since trial
by jury is denied both in municipal court and on appeal therefrom,
the result of many a conviction today, it is submitted, is the unconstitutional deprivation of an important substantive right that cannot
44
properly be divested other than by jury trial.
It is not contended that a jury trial should be granted for every
offense tried in municipal court-even though anyone convicted of
any offense in a justice of the peace court can obtain such a trial on
appeal - but for such serious offenses as drunken or reckless driving,
which sentences have such a tremendous impact upon one's ability
to earn his livelihood, a jury trial should be available as of right.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing criticisms are not meant to imply that municipal
judges, city attorneys, and police are dishonest or incompetent, but
reform of their procedure is overdue. Community self-protection
neither necessitates nor justifies summary sacrifice of basic individual
rights. Speed, especially in judicial proceedings involving heavy sentences, can be purchased at far too high a price. Certain positive suggestions are offered for consideration.
First, police officers should have firmly impressed upon them the
fact that conviction in every instance is not synonymous with justice
and that, specifically, they are witnesses rather than prosecutors. Acquittal does not signify that the arresting officer is incompetent; and
he should be free of any repercussions and of any feeling that he is
not being "backed up" if the accused is not convicted. What the city
officials want - or should want - from the police is facts, and only
42FLA. STAT. §322.26 (1951) was enacted as Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19551, §38; since
then it has been amended.
43See note 12 supra.
44The author recently presented this question to a circuit court on appeal
but also assigned other error. The court reversed the judgment on the basis of
that other error and accordingly declined ruling on the constitutional question,
which still merits determination on an appropriate occasion.
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facts. Severe penalties should be provided, and enforced, for booking
on a charge of "investigation," for holding the prisoner incommunicado, and for physical mistreatment in connection with "questioning."
Citizens can improve the picture substantially by insisting politically that the chief have an accurate concept of his job. Some mistakes
in making arrests are inevitable. Citizens can also see to it that policemen receive not only adequate compensation - which they are not
afforded now - but also that they are accorded proper respect for
their work, as in England and Canada, for example. In particular,
parents should not inculcate in children, even by implication, the
feeling that a "cop" is a man that punishes civilians, a man to be
avoided, an enemy.
Second, municipal judges and mayors should develop enough sense
of duty to ignore incompetent evidence, especially when the accused
has no counsel, to afford him the presumption of innocence, and to
insist upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Their ingrained notion that reputable civilians are largely liars is especially
reprehensible.
Third, either trial by jury should be afforded for the more serious
charges, such as "driving while under the influence" and reckless driving, or this jurisdiction should be transferred to a court that observes
traditional Anglo-American procedure.
Fourth, the driver's license requirement45 should be strictly enforced. The mandatory imprisonment for at least one day prescribed
for driving after suspension or revocation- 6 could well be extended
to include any driving without a license. Far too many individuals
of means, driving illegally, buy their way out by merely paying a fine
that they can easily afford.
Fifth, the drunkometer test should either be made more nearly
accurate in relation to what it is supposed to prove or be outlawed.
Furthermore, refusal to submit to it should not be permitted to amount
to conviction - as so often happens at present.
Sixth, an organization like the North Carolina Traffic Court Insti4
tute would be of great assistance in Florida. 7
§§322.03 et seq. (1951).
401d. §322.34. A fine up to $500 may be imposed in addition, but it cannot
be substituted for imprisonment.
47The School of Law of the University of North Carolina, in cooperation with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, works with sheriffs, police departments and
the highway patrol in teaching procedure of arrest and presentation of evidence.
45FLA. STAT.
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Seventh, attorneys engaged in municipal court practice should
represent their clients as vigorously as possible within the code of
legal ethics. Younger attorneys will find that this type of practice
is moderately compensatory and that in any event it furnishes excellent
training for bigger battles. All attorneys must realize that whenever
a client takes his predicament seriously enough to retain counsel he
is entitled to his money's worth, even in the informality of the municipal court. Defense counsel should make full use of such procedural
safeguards as appeals, insistence upon an accurate record, cross-examination, habeas corpus proceedings, and actions for false arrest.4s Until
such time as Florida municipal arrest and trial procedures sincerely
embrace due process, counsel must be doubly alert.
Finally, The Florida Bar and the local bar associations should
utilize legal institutes, lawyer-police-layman round tables, publications,
addresses to civic and other clubs, and indeed all possible media to
promote at least some understanding of the problems and functioning
of municipal courts and police, as well as to commend fair and efficient administration and to spotlight ruthlessly those evil practices
that still survive.
Some of these warnings may sound alarmist and some of the suggestions idealistic - but small leaks in the dam of democracy can
cause a devastating flood in a surprisingly short time. There is no
reason among conscientious citizens why the local administration of
justice should be the worst. It is easy to say, "We are dealing with
just a little misdemeanor"; but to each accused the case is important
and, when unjustly handled, works severe and undeserved hardship
in many an instance. Worse still, such maladministration builds up
a cynical attitude toward the police, the city attorney, and the bench,
and eventually leads to disrespect for law and its enforcement generally.

4sFor an excellent -recent example, involving habeas corpus and subsequent
high-handed action by a municipal judge himself, see Farish v. Smoot, 58 So.2d
534 (Fla. 1952). The opinion, which is thorough, is analyzed in 6 U. oF FLA. L.
Rxv. 259 (1953).
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